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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH UNION CANAL COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL E. NEWELL and 
RUTH I. NEWELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 14238 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants for an order com-
pelling the removal of a fence which had been erected along the 
right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use by the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
District Court found in favor of the defendants holding 
that the plaintiff did have a right-of-way across the defendants1 
property for its canal, including the bank of said canal, but that 
the plaintiff did not prove that the fence erected by the defendants 
interfered with the use of said right-of-way. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A reversal of the District Court's decision finding that 
thefence did not interfere with the use of plaintiff's right-of-way, 
and an order remanding this case to the District Court for a finding 
that such fence interferes with the right-of-way of plaintiff and 
ordering its removal. 
l / .' :- • 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, North Union Canal Company, a Utah corpor-
ation, is a stock company owned by land owners utilizing the water 
from said canal for irrigation purposes in Orem,Lindon and Pleasant 
Grove cities in Utah County. This canal runs diagonally from the 
mouth of Provo Canyon through Orem City in a northwesterly direction, 
and carries water diverted from the Provo River. The canal was con-
structed before the turn of the century and a cement lining was 
installed in the 1950's for the purpose of conserving water. 
It is acknowledged by the defendants that the plaintiff 
has established an easement for the canal as well as an easement upon 
its banks for maintenance, cleaning and repairs. (TR. page 31,33,34). 
However, defendants contend that a fence which was erected in the 
summer of 1974 along the West bank of said canal for approximately 
150 feet, does not interfere with the right of way admittedly established 
by plaintiff. 
At the time the fence was being installed, Mr. Gillmen con-
fronted the defendant, Mr. Newell, stating that he felt that the 
installation was contrary to the rights of the plaintiff and its 
easement. However, the defendant continued the erection of the fence, 
and the lower court sustained his argument that it did not interfere 
with the plaintiff's use of the canal. 
The plaintiff produced at the trial several witnesses who 
testified that the use of the West bank was essential to maintenance. 
This testimony was produced from Kenneth Gillman that when repairs 
are made will interfere, (TR. page 17, 19); by Mr. Leonard S. Walker 
that cement lining could not be replaced with fence in present 
location. (TR, page 33, 34); by J. Eldon Swensen (TR. page 45, 46); 
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by the plaintiff's engineer, Hugh A. McKellar, (TR. page 63); and 
William Pratt testified interfered with spraying weeds (TR. page 68). 
All of these witnesses are present or past officers of the plaintiff 
with the exception of Mr. McKellar who is their engineer. The only 
testimony to the contrary was the owner of the servient estate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EVIDENCE 
TO BE INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE EASEMENT 
NOW, HAS BEEN, OR WILL IN THE FUTURE, BE 
V INTERFERRED WITH BY THE ERECTION OF A FENCE 
BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
The defendantfs fence, erected in the summer of 1974, is 
on the very edge of the West bank of plaintiff's cement lined canal. 
It is the testimony of numerous witnesses as outlined in the Statement 
of Facts, that periodically said canal requires the repair and re-
placement of its cement lining. When this becomes necessary, heavy 
equipment is required to be taken along the bank of the canal, the 
cement lining which has deteriorated, broken out, placed in a truck* 
carried away, and new cement installed from a ready-mix truck. 
(See TR. page 46). The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff's 
easement was established without fences present along the edge of 
its canal. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to the continued use 
of this easement without such interference. 
POINT II 
THE CONSENT OF THE APPELLANT IS NECESSARY 
BEFORE RESPONDENTS MAY ALTER OR INTERFERE WITH 
THE APPELLANT'S ESTABLISHED EASEMENT. 
The uncontroverted testimony is that the appellant's right 
of way was established free of fences along the banks of the canal 
and the statutes of this State Case Law and the Restatement of property 
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all clearly hold that the servient estate, the respondents in this 
case, may not interfere with such established rights without the 
consent of the dominant estate. 
The general statements of law contained in 25 A.J. 2d, 
beginning with §85, dealing with the maintenance and repairs of 
easements states, beginning in §86: 
"In order that the owner of an easement may perform 
the duty of keeping it in repair, he has the right 
to enter the servient estate at all reasonable 
times to effect the necessary repairs and maintenance 
or even to make original construction necessary for 
the enjoyment of the easement." 
Also, §87 states: 
"Generally when the character of an easement is once 
fixed no material alterations can be made by either 
the. servient or easement owner without the others 
consent." 
The rights and duties of dominant owner is also set forth 
in 169 A.L.R. 1148 which sustains the general proposition that the 
servient owner may not interfere with the established easement 
rights without consent. 
In the State of Utah the servient owner is further restricted 
by statute from erecting a fence which interferes. Such conduct is 
prohibited by Title 73-1-15 U.C.A. 1953, which states: 
"Whenever any person, partnership, company or corporation, 
has a right of way of an established type or title for 
any canal or other watercourse it shall be unlawful for 
any person, persons or governmental agencies to place 
or maintain in place any obstruction, or change of 
the water flow by fence or otherwise, along or across 
or in such canal or watercourse, except as where said 
watercourse inflicts damage to private property, 
without first receiving written permission for the 
change and providing gates sufficient for the passage 
of the owner or owners of such canal or watercourse. 
4. 
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That the vested rights in the established canals and 
watercourse shall be protected against all encroachments. 
That indemnifying agreements may be entered as may be 
just and proper by governmental agencies. Any person, 
partnership, company or corporation, violating the 
provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and is subject to damages and costs." 
(underlining ours) 
In the instant casa the appellant has established that such 
fence as erected by the defendants is an encroachment upon their 
vested rights in an established easement and they did not consent to 
its erection. Such consent of the dominant owner is essential. 
The Case Law of Utah and other jurisdictions supports appellant's 
position. See Holm vs. Davis, et al, 41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403, which 
states: 
"The owner of a dominant estate having an easement 
has a right to enter upon the servient estate and make 
repairs necessary for the reasonable and convenient 
use of the easement, doing no unnecessary injury 
to the servient estate." 
The court further held in this case that appellant's had a 
right to maintain the canal and, for that purpose, had a right to 
enter the land owned by the servient estate and make all necessary 
repairs, and to clean out said ditch at all reasonable times. 
Also, in Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah page 57, 276 P. 912, 
the court stated that the owner of a dominant estate has the right 
to go upon the lands of the servient owner and remove obstructions 
from the bed of the stream if such is necessary to permit the water 
to continue its flow. 
Also see Nephi Irrigation Co. vs. Bailey, 111 Utah 402, 
181 P. 2d 215, in which the court stated: 
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"The owner of a dominant estate having an easement has 
a right to enter upon servient estate, and make 
repairs necessary for reasonable and convenient use 
of the easement, doing no unnecessary injury to the 
servient estate.11 
In Nielson vs. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696, the 
court stated: 
flThe easement right of plaintiff over, across and through 
the lands and premises of defendants as herein set forth, 
was for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to construct, 
improve, maintain and repair its said canals.11 
(underlining ours) 
This principle is also set forth in Dyer vs. Compere, 
41 N.M. 716, 73 P. 2d 1356; Pioneer Irrigation District vs. Smith, 
48 Idaho 734, 285 P. at page 475; and Hotchkiss vs. Young, 42 Or. 446, 
71 P. 324. 
It is also the law that the extent of an easement acquired 
by prescription is measured and limited by the use made during the 
prescriptive period. In this case the North Union Canal Co. has used 
the banks of the canal and repaired from the banks since the early 
1900fs. 
See Nielson vs. Sandberg, supra; Robins vs. Roberts 
80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340; Stephens Ranch & Live Stock 
Co. vs. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459; 
28 C.J.S., Easements, § 95C. 
A few of the cases in foreign jurisdictions which sustain 
appellant's position are Tauscher, et al vs. Andruss, 401 P.R. 2d 40, 
which holds: 
"An easement owner has right not only to be free from 
interference with his actual use but also his possible 
prospective uses." 
Thus, it is not incumbent upon the appellant to show that the fence 
of the respondents interferes with daily or yearly use of the 
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easement, but that it will interfere at some future date. 
See also, Siegel vs. Starzyk, 130 N.E. 499; 
Valley Development Co. vs. Weeks, 364 P.R. 2d 730, 
which holds: 
"The owner of a servient estate had no legal right 
to destroy vested property right of owner of easement 
for ditch traversing the servient estate by 
providing substitute deemed adequate by servient owners 
without securing easement owners consent.11 
Perhaps the clearest expression of the principle of law 
appellant is attempting to convey is the Illustration given in 
5 Restatement, Property § 510, Illustration 3 at page 3106, by the 
following hypothetical case: 
,f
 'A owns an easement of way consisting of the 
privilege of maintaining a road thirty feet wide 
across White-acre, which is owned and possessed 
by B. C, a stranger, erects a fence which 
reduces the space available for use as a road to 
twenty feet. Twenty feet is sufficient for A's 
needs. A has a cause of action against C.f 
It is not necessary for the easement owner to show 
that he has plans for certain uses in the future 
which would be interfered with by a defendant's 
conduct if that future use were made; it is enough 
if the easement owner proves that there has been an 
encroachment. The evidence clearly establishes an 
encroachment in the present case.11 
Further statements which indicate how universally accepted 
is the principle of law that the easement owner has a right to repair 
the easement is set forth in 169 A.L.R. 1148, which states: 
"The right of the owner of a water easement to 
keep the easement in repair ... appears to be 
unquestioned.11 
It is conceded that the respondents fence encloses a very 
small portion of appellant's canal. However, if the District Court's 
7. 
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decision is sustained, it establishes a precedent which will allow 
adjacent owners to ferice off the canal making proper maintenance 
by the appellant impossible, 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in holding that the fence erected by 
the respondents on the edge of appellantfs canal did not interfere with 
the use of the easement and, therefore, the appellant is entitled 
to a reversal of this decision and an order compelling the respondents 
to remove said fence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Appellant 
75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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